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FOREWORD: HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RULE OF LAW, AND NATIONAL 
SOVEREIGNTY 
Gary L. McDowell∗  & Stephen B. Presser∗∗ 
 ¶ 1 On July 23, 2000, in London, England, we were the convenors of a conference 
jointly sponsored by the University of London’s Institutes of Advanced Legal Studies, 
Historical Research, and United States Studies and Northwestern University School of 
Law, made possible by a grant from the Searle Fund.1  The title of the conference was At 
Century's Dawn: The future and past of human rights and the rule of law.   Five principal 
papers were presented at that conference, and now appear as articles in this volume of 
Northwestern University’s Journal of International Human Rights.   
¶ 2 The five papers explored different aspects of the conference’s principal theme, 
whether “human rights,” as then generally understood, were consistent with the basis of 
the Anglo-American jurisprudential system, the rule of law. 2  The conference had been 
convened following NATO’s intervention in the Balkans, the first time that organization 
had used armed force against a U.N. member state without the express authorization of 
the United Nations Security Council.  That intervention was undertaken ostensibly to 
protect the “human rights” of Balkan minority groups, although it appeared to be in 
tension with the United Nation’s Charter’s guarantee of and protection for national 
sovereignty.   
¶ 3 Since the conference, of course, the events of September 11, 2001, resulting in 
the death and destruction from terrorist acts of several thousand persons in New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C. led to the current “war on terror,” waged through 
military campaigns by the United States and its allies in Afghanistan and Iraq.  All of 
these activities have led to an increased awareness of human rights issues, as this country 
seeks to balance its need for security against individual freedoms.   All five of the papers 
presented here do not expressly address issues involved in that balance, but insofar as 
each of them clarifies what is meant by “human rights,” and insofar as each of them does 
seek to understand how nations and the world can further “human rights” while 
                                                 
∗ Tyler Haynes Interdisciplinary Professor of Leadership Studies and Political Science, University of 
Richmond (formerly Director, Institute of United States Studies, University of London). 
∗∗ Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History, Northwestern University School of Law and Associate 
Research Fellow, Institute of United States Studies, University of London. 
1 We gratefully acknowledge the generosity of the Searle Fund board, and in particular Dan Searle, Gideon 
Searle , Henry Bienen, and David Van Zandt, in sponsoring the conference and in underwriting the 
publication of this volume.  Dean Van Zandt, in particular, was with us in London, and gave an opening 
speech at the conference.  We are also very grateful to the editors of the Northwestern University Journal of 
International Human Rights for offering us this forum for publication and for splendidly editing the 
contributions. 
2 As Professor Sir John Baker reminds us in a footnote to his paper in this volume: “[t]he two are linked in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Sir John Baker, Human Rights and the Rule of Law in 
Renaissance England, 2 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 3, fn.14, at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/JIHR/v2/3 (2004). (citing Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948): “It is essential . . . that human rights should be 
protected by the rule of law.”)).  
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simultaneously maintaining national sovereignty and the rule of law, they are 
indispensable reading of great contemporary relevance.    
¶ 4 In the first of these papers, The Idea of Natural Rights—Origins and 
Persistence, Professor Brian Tierney furnishes a working definition, “[n]atural rights or 
human rights are rights that inhere in persons by reason of their very humanity.”3 Tierney 
seeks to address the question whether “our modern culture of rights [is] a Western 
peculiarity with no resonance for the rest of humanity.”4  Tierney concludes that in its 
early stages our current concept of “human rights,” was in fact a Western creation, and 
that “jurists of the twelfth century, especially the church lawyers, played an important 
innovatory role.”5 Tierney demonstrates how, as a result of what he calls “juristic 
semantics,” “the little phrase ius naturale shifted from an objective to a subjective 
meaning, [and] an ancient concept of natural law was reshaped into a modern idea of 
natural rights.”6  Tierney’s “church lawyers,” were struggling to define a means of 
protecting the church against the increasing assertiveness of Kings and Lords, and out of 
their efforts, carried on pursuant to a “great revival of legal studies,” and a recovery of 
the jurisprudence of antiquity, came the basis for our modern conception of rights that 
protect individuals against the assertion of the arbitrary power of governments.  
¶ 5 Professor Tierney also reminds us that it may sometimes be too facile to see an 
opposition between the assertion of individual rights and the continuing needs of the 
community in the maintenance of the rule of law. He reminds us that among the purposes 
of jurisprudence, after all, is to secure the rights of individuals, and that his twelfth 
century churchmen “could have agreed with a modern philosopher, Jacques Maritain, 
when he wrote that ‘there is nothing more illusory than to pose the problem of the person 
and the common good in terms of opposition.’”7 
¶ 6 Professor Sir John Baker, in Human Rights and the Rule of Law in 
Renaissance England, further develops this theme of the symbiotic relationship between 
the rule of law and human rights by reminding us that the most important “human right” 
is the rule of law itself.  As do the papers of Professors Glendon and Cassel, Professor 
Baker reminds us that we have not (and perhaps never will) arrive at a situation where 
our governments or our supra-national organizations fully secure “universal human 
rights,”  especially when we are threatened by “hidden enemies.”  But Baker nicely 
asserts that the fact that the security measures that appear to infringe these “rights,” are 
“controversial nevertheless shows that the old philosophy of the rule of law is not 
moribund; indeed, it still applies in most everyday situations and is regarded as the 
ideal.”8  
                                                 
3 Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights—Origins and Persistence, 2 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 2, fn.2, 
at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/JIHR/v2/2 (2004).  
4 Id. at ¶ 1. 
5 Id. at ¶ 5. 
6 Id.  
7 Id. at ¶ 17 (quoting  JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 67 (1966)). 
8 Baker, supra note 2, at ¶ 1.  
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  ¶ 7 Professor Baker, in a manner similar to that of Professor Tierney, then 
proceeds to explore “the hypothesis that these ‘human’ rights are not such a new 
departure as is fashionably supposed, but rather an attempt to restate and refine 
assumptions which have long been present in the [English] common law.”9  He reminds 
us that in the seventeenth century great champions of the common law like Sir Edward 
Coke and his colleagues in the House of Commons began “collectively to assert the 
‘rights’ of the people,” in order to counter the threat of Stuart absolutism. 10  Moreover, 
Baker explains that “these ancient rights of which parliamentarians spoke were not 
universal “human” rights or rights derived from some abstract regime superior to 
municipal law,” but instead were “the rights and liberties of Englishmen, inherited by 
birth like other forms of franchise or property, guaranteed over the centuries by charters 
of liberties and statutes of due process, and believed to be superior to such rights as might 
belong to the peoples of benighted nations.”11 
¶ 8 Baker thus elaborates a particularly English strain of “human rights law,” and 
shows the flourishing of this strain in a time, the early English Renaissance, commonly 
thought to be characterized by the arbitrary rule of Henry VIII.  Though Baker quite 
nicely stresses the unique features of the English experience, again, as did Tierney, he 
does help us understand that:  
[t]here are two basic features of human rights law for which 
comparisons might be sought in an earlier age.  First, there is the 
substantive content of the corpus of rights as now understood, in 
the sense of the broad moral or legal assumptions which they 
represent.  Second, and more fundamental from the lawyer’s point 
of view, there is the notion that some of those rights are (or ought 
to be) so fundamental that they are somehow entrenched against 
legislative interference.12 
¶ 9 These two features, Baker reminds us, “represent some kind of higher law, 
antecedent morally—if not historically—to man-made law,” and further that “[a] 
precondition for both of these notions is the existence of a political constitution which 
embodies or recognises what is commonly labeled the Rule of Law —meaning, in broad 
terms, that rulers are obliged to govern according to known principles of law and not in a 
despotic or arbitrary manner.”13  In the rest of his paper Professor Baker shows 
convincingly that “[t]here is a case for saying that none of these three phenomena [a 
corpus of substantive rights, the entrenchment of those rights against legislative 
interference, and the maintenance of the rule of law to secure those rights] were alien to 
English law in the Renaissance period.”14  
                                                 
9 Id.  
10 Id. at ¶ 2.  
11 Id. at ¶ 3.  
12 Id. at ¶ 4.  
13 Id.  
14 Id.  
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¶ 10 In his paper, Natural Rights and Modern Constitutionalism, Professor 
Michael Zuckert continues the essentially chronological treatment of this volume by 
moving to the framing of the United States Constitution, and explaining how the 
American framers conceived of a means to maintain the rule of law not through the 
balancing of orders in society, as did the English, but rather through the separation of 
legislative, executive and judicial powers.  As does Baker, Zuckert explores the 
interconnection of concepts of rights and the rule of law, and in the course of this 
explanation, he makes “three contributions to the understanding of modern 
constitutionalism.”15  These are (1) “to contest the view that Montesquieu was not a 
natural rights thinker,” (2) to show that Montesquieu’s “version of natural rights 
decisively shaped his constitutional theory,” and (3) to show “how the American 
constitution came to contain judicial review as a result of the particular way in which the 
American founders attempted to adapt Montesquieuan constitutional theory to their own 
circumstances.”16    
¶ 11 Zuckert’s study of Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu leads him to examine 
two “central dimensions of modern constitutionalism,” derived “from the Lockean 
natural rights orientation: governments have a definite and limited teleology, to secure 
rights; they have a limited and precise object.  Moreover, governments are not to be 
exempt from controls and limitations; the controller must also be controlled.”17  Thus 
Zuckert, as do other contributors here, links human rights (here “Lockean natural rights”) 
with the rule of law’s limitations on arbitrary governmental acts. Zuckert shows how 
Montesquieu thought these two aspects of modern constitutionalism could be best 
secured by a complex combination of “separated powers, checks and balances, and mixed 
government.”18  He then proceeds elegantly to show how Madison and the Constitution’s 
framers adopted this understanding of Montesquieu’s to the constitutional needs of an 
American people unwilling to permit a mixed government containing a King and 
hereditary aristocracy, with what seems like primary reliance on the new institution of 
judicial review to maintain separation of powers and checks and balances.   
    ¶ 12 In the course of his exposition, Zuckert explains why the Court has always 
been a source of controversy at the same time it has effectively preserved “modern 
constitutionalism.”   For Zuckert, “[t]here is a built- in disproportion between the 
[Supreme Court’s] political tasks and the legal tools with which these are supposed to be 
accomplished.”19  It can try, as courts have historically done, to decide issues on a 
narrowly legal basis, “following the rule of the ‘clear mistake’ or applying a strictly 
originalist approach to cases,” but it must also attempt “to fulfill the broader, political, 
trans- legal system needs thrown into its lap” by the Constitutional scheme of separation 
of powers and checks and balances.20  As Zuckert observes, “[r]esponding to that 
                                                 
15 Michael Zuckert, Natural Rights and Modern Constitutionalism, 2 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 4, ¶ 1, at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/JIHR/v2/4 (2004).    
16 Id.  
17 Id. at ¶ 19.  
18 Id. at ¶ 31.  
19 Id. at ¶ 78.  
20 Id.  
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dilemma, the Court is constantly driven beyond the bounds of strict lega lity in order to do 
its political work, and thus opens itself at frequent intervals to the charge that it has (once 
again) gotten too big for its admittedly capacious britches.”21   
  ¶ 13 Perhaps in the tension that Zuckert discovers between the Court’s political 
and legal roles is seen something of an eternal conflict between the assertion of individual 
human rights and the maintenance of the institutions devoted to the rule of law which 
enforce them.  In his close analysis of Madison and Montesquieu’s thought, Zuckert 
examines this tension at the level of national constitutional government, while Professor 
Mary Ann Glendon, in her piece, The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, explores the problem in terms of international law.   
¶ 14 Professor Glendon’s statement of these articles’ common theme is that “[i]t is 
a commonplace that long lists of rights are empty words in the absence of a legal and 
political order in which rights can be realized.”22 She proceeds to demonstrate how the 
architects of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) sought to 
balance their articulation of  internationally-valid basic human rights with the 
maintenance of national and international institutions to secure those rights, including, for 
example,  
a right “to take part in the government of [one’s] country”; a right 
to “a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be realized”; an 
acknowledgment that everyone’s rights are limited by the need for 
“meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the 
general welfare in a democratic society”; and an express 
recognition of the importance of the rule of law. 23 
¶ 15 Glendon praises the “political realism of the men and women who drafted the 
Universal Declaration,” and indicates that many current human rights advocates may 
have “forgotten or ignored” how attention to the rule of law and the institutions which 
secure it are indispensable to the protection of human rights.24  The aim of her essay, she 
explains, is “to recall the history of the rule-of-law provisions of the UDHR with the hope 
of shedding some light on current controversies over the respective roles of nation-states 
and international bodies in bringing human rights to life.”25   Among the many virtues of 
Glendon’s piece is her effort, through her reading and exposition of the UDHR, both to 
make clear what are the modern relatively uncontroversial notions of human rights and 
political participation, 26 as well to suggest those “rights” that still have not achieved full 
                                                 
21 Id.  
22 Mary Ann Glendon, The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 2 NW. U. J.  INT’L 
HUM. RTS. 5, ¶ 1, at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/JIHR/v2/5 (2004).    
23 Id. (quoting Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra  note 2, at Arts. 21, 28, 29, and prmbl. (3)). 
24 Id. at ¶ 2.  
25 Id.  
26 E.g., “rights to life, liberty, and personal security; bans on slavery and torture; rights to legal recognition, 
equality before the law, and effective remedies for violation of fundamental rights; freedom from arbitrary 
arrest and detention; guarantees of fair criminal procedures, the presumption of innocence, and the 
principle of non-retroactivity in criminal law” as well as “freedom of religion and belief; freedom of 
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acceptance as basic human entitlements governments are instituted to supply. 27  Simply to 
enumerate these “rights” of the UDHR is to demonstrate how some of them may actually 
be in conflict—how, for example, does one easily reconcile the “right to nationality,” 
with “freedom of movement and the right of return,” or “the right to seek and enjoy 
political asylum?”  More troubling, how do some of these more commonly accepted 
rights, which seem to depend for their enforcement on the exercise of national 
sovereignty and political participation of citizens easily co-exist with the Declaration’s 
Article 28, “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”28   
¶ 16 Professor Glendon very nicely exposes the difficulties that the securing of 
these expansive rights pose for nations like ours, leery of central planning, and even 
socialist nations reluctant to allow individuals the full panoply of private rights which the 
UDHR seems to favor.  Glendon appears to suggest that the means of reconciling these 
conflicting needs and tensions, as the framers of the UDHR understood, is to guarantee 
the rule of law and to adopt a somewhat Burkean tolerance for individual nations to 
evolve indigenous structures and institutions for the gradual and eventual achievement of 
many of these rights.  For Glendon, then, and for the framers of the UDHR, the 
articulation of human rights may be as much about aspirations, ideals, and gradual 
evolution as they are about revolution or instant gratification.  As Eleanor Roosevelt, one 
of these distinguished framers, put it, the “[m]ethods for ensuring the realization of those 
rights .  .  . would necessarily vary from one country to another and such variations 
should be considered not only inevitable but salutary.’”29   
¶ 17 If the recognition of the need for variations among nations (and, perhaps the 
preservation of national character) was a crucial and fragile insight of the UDHR’s 
framers, so, Professor Glendon rightly stresses, was their understanding set forth in 
Article 29, of the inevitable linkage of individual duties with individual rights:   
(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free 
and full development of his personality is possible.   
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for 
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights 
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of 
                                                                                                                                                 
opinion, expression, and communication; freedom of assembly and association; and the ‘right to take part 
in government . . . directly or through freely chosen representatives.’” Id. at ¶¶ 9, 12 (citing Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, supra  note 2).  
27 Including, apparently, “the right to be free of arbitrary interference with one’s ‘privacy, family, home, or 
correspondence’ and from arbitrary attacks upon one’s ‘honor and reputation’; freedom of movement and 
the right of return; the right to seek and enjoy political asylum; the right to a nationality; the right to marry 
and to found a family, the right of the family as such to ‘protection by society and the State,’ and the right 
to own property,”  as well as   “rights to a minimum standard of living, to work, to social security in the 
event of unemployment or disability, to form and join unions, and to education.” Id. at ¶ 11.  
28 Id. at ¶ 16 (quoting  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra  note 2, at Art. 28).  
29 Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting  Human Rights Commission, 3d Sess., at 5-6, E/CN.4/SR64 (1947)).  
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morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic 
society.   
(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.30 
¶ 18 Clause (3) of Article 29 obviously raises some difficulties for national 
sovereignty, since the U.N.’s charter never successfully resolves the conflict it creates 
between the human rights and the national sovereignty which it seeks simultaneously to 
guarantee.  But one needs only to read the first two provisions of Article 29, and its 
impressive understanding that personality needs community to develop, to realize the 
poverty of conception and understanding of highly- individualistic pronouncements like 
the infamous 1992 “mystery passage” of the United States Supreme Court, recently 
invoked to find a right to engage in adult consensual homosexual conduct free from 
criminal penalties.31   
¶ 19 Glendon closes her piece on a cautionary note, “[w]hat many of today’s 
internationalists have forgotten, or chosen to ignore, is that [the framers of the UDHR]  
saw the rule of law at the national level as the best and surest legal means for protecting 
human rights.”32  For Glendon, then, national sovereignty and the rule of law are as 
indispensable foundations for human rights, as are the international governmental 
organizations such as the U.N., NATO, or NGO’s.  Her caution nicely places in context 
and perspective the concluding essay by Professor Douglass Cassel, who reviews the 
work of these international organizations in his piece, The Globalization of Human 
Rights: Consciousness, Law, and Reality.  
¶ 20 Professor Cassel laments what he regards as “sharp setbacks” for human 
rights in the four years since his paper was originally delivered, as a result of the war on 
terrorism, but still finds reasons for “guarded optimism.”  He describes “a revolution in 
global human rights consciousness, law and institutions,” that has occurred over the last 
half-century, the period that begins with the UDHR. 33 “Atrocities are still committed,” he 
tells us, “but we now have international legal tools to address them—if we have the 
will.”34  Cassel seeks to determine how this extraordinary change in the last five decades 
has come to be, and, in particular how in “both a formal and a real sense, basic human 
                                                 
30 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra  note 2, at Art. 29.  
31 “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of the universe, and of the 
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they 
found under the compulsion of the state.”  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
851 (1992) (plurality opinion of Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter).  The “mystery passage” was cited as 
justification for the invalidation of criminal penalties for consensual adult homosexual acts in Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion for the court in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct 2472, 2482, 539 U.S. 558, ___ (2003).  
The “mystery passage” wrongly assumes that one defines one’s own concept of personhood and fails to 
understand that meaning in life does not come from individual decision but from relationships with one’s 
fellows in society.  Conversely, Article 29 of the UDHR makes this clear. 
32 Glendon, supra note 22, at ¶ 28.  
33 Douglass Cassel, The Globalization of Human Rights: Consciousness, Law, and Reality, 2 NW. U. J. 
INT’L HUM. RTS. 6, ¶ 7, at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/JIHR/v2/6 (2004).     
34 Id.  
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rights are no longer merely national, but global concerns.”35  While Professor Glendon 
identified as a positive aspect of the UDHR that it stressed duties as well as rights, 
Professor Cassel attributes much of the accelerated concern with human rights to a mind-
set that is less interested in community and more interested in individuality, albeit 
devoted to the rule of law rather than “authoritarian compulsion.”36  Indeed, he concludes 
that “[i]nternational law today formally recognizes almost all human rights, for almost all 
persons, in almost all places.”37    
¶ 21 Accompanying, and helping to foster this “rights consciousness,” Cassel 
argues, is “a proliferation of global and regional institutions and mechanisms—reporting 
requirements, monitoring devices, public hearings, special mediators, investigative 
bodies, complaint procedures, international courts, admission requirements for 
international organizations, bilateral and multilateral diplomatic and economic sanctions, 
and even occasional military intervention.”38  Still, Cassel warns that the “rights 
revolution” has yet to “triumph on the ground,” as “the 1990’s saw massive ethnic 
cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, genocide in Rwanda, indiscriminate shelling of 
civilians in Chechnya, unspeakable brutality in Sierra Leone, unchecked violence in 
Colombia and the Congo, continued systemic violence against women in many countries, 
and widespread poverty and growing economic inequality within and between nations.”39 
¶ 22 Of particular interest in Professor Cassel’s analysis is the distinction he draws 
between the United States and the United Kingdom.  While Professors Baker and Zuckert 
are able to discover important foundations for human rights and the rule of law in both 
the English and American traditions, Cassel states that:  
[w]ith respect to international human rights law, despite their 
common rights traditions, the U.K. and U.S. are at radically 
different stages of development.  The U.K. is party in a meaningful 
way to human rights treaties and courts.  London yields to 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, even in 
controversial cases of public interest.  Britain is subject as well to 
human rights rulings by the European Court of Justice.  Although 
among the last Council of Europe members to do so, Britain 
recently made European human rights law enforceable in domestic 
courts . . .. 
The U.S., on the other hand, is not yet prepared to submit to international human rights 
law.  We refuse to join widely accepted treaties on rights of women and children, on anti-
personnel land mines, on an International Criminal Court, and on economic and social 
rights, as well as our regional human rights treaty.  Although we have ratified treaties on 
genocide, torture, race discrimination, and civil and political rights, we attached 
debilitating reservations.   These provisos conform the application of treaty norms in the 
                                                 
35 Id. at ¶ 139.  
36 Id. at ¶ 9.  
37 Id. at ¶ 15.  
38 Id. at ¶ 16.  
39 Id. at ¶ 18.  
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U.S. to our national preferences.  They also make the treaties largely unenforceable in our 
domestic courts, while declining to accept even non-binding international complaint 
procedures, let alone the jurisdiction of international courts. 40   
¶ 23 Professor Cassel’s strong implication is that the United States would do well 
to follow the example of the United Kingdom, and that this country ought better to 
appreciate “the advantages of international law,” especially as “the rising future power of 
Europe and Asia constrains American unilateralism . . ..”41  There is a very strong 
idealistic and, indeed, religious dimension to Professor Cassel’s piece.  He takes very 
seriously the “basic question, one first posed at the dawn of the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition: Are we our brothers' keeper?”42  His answer to that question would seem to be 
in the affirmative, but he acknowledges a difficulty in modern democracies, such as the 
United States, accepting that burden, because “[t]o do so will often entail costs—in 
domestic political support, sovereignty, trade benefits, investment opportunities, tax 
revenue and, on occasion, the safety of our soldiers.”43  
¶ 24 The preservation of traditional national sovereignty does not loom large for 
Professor Cassel, and most of his paper is a description of the development of institutions 
and legal doctrines that have led to an undermining of that sovereignty.  For him it is now 
“clear that gross violations of human rights are not within domestic sovereignty.”44  He 
stresses that:  
[a]lthough recalcitrant nations even now yelp ‘national 
sovereignty’ and ‘domestic jurisdiction’ when called to 
international account, their legal argument is no longer credible.  
No government believes it, except perhaps the one attempting to 
resurrect it as a defense.  In international law, human rights have 
won the war against exclusive domestic sovereignty. 45  
 ¶ 25 Professor Cassel furnishes an invaluable catalogue of the development of 
governmental, non-governmental, and international economic institutions which have 
begun to supersede national governments as enforcers of human rights and promulgators 
of international “rights consciousness,” and he paints an impressive picture of what has 
been accomplished.  
In the last two decades, life expectancy in the developing world 
rose from fifty-five to sixty-five years.  Adult literacy increased 
from forty-eight percent to seventy-two percent.  Infant mortality 
declined from one-hundred-and-ten to sixty-four per one-thousand 
                                                 
40 Id. at ¶ 21.  
41 Id. at ¶ 23.  
42 Id. at ¶ 27.  
43 Id.  
44 Id. at ¶ 49.  
45 Id.  
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live births.  Access of rural populations to safe drinking water 
increased from thirteen percent to seventy-one percent.46 
¶ 26 For Cassel, however, “the rights revolution still has far to go before its values 
of dignity, security, equality and liberty are realized for most people.”47  Among the 
difficult question Professor Cassel raises by implication, however, is how does one weigh 
the costs of the diminishment of national sovereignty or even national culture that would 
be paid to purchase the triumph of individual human rights its advocates seek?  Professor 
Glendon’s framers of the UDHR would be disinclined to surrender the one to further the 
other.  Professor Baker may be less sanguine about the superiority of the political 
conclusion the U.K. has reached with regard to Human Rights.  He explains that:  
as a result of activities in Strasbourg, the conception of human 
rights in the United Kingdom has undergone a transformation.  
They are no longer seen as a set of essentially British ideas, rooted 
in history, shared by other civilised nations, and framed into a code 
chiefly for the purpose of export to less favoured parts of the 
globe.  They have become instead a source of ammunition for 
overturning domestic judicial precedent and legislation by recourse 
to vaguely defined concepts, sometimes interpreted in a 
mechanical way without reference to history, and an unlimited 
selection of loosely related ideas from around the world.  The 
obvious danger of this newer movement is not merely 
uncertainty—which, paradoxically, is itself inconsistent with the 
rule of law—but the increasing politicisation of an unelected 
judiciary.  Whether that is a fair price to pay for a formal check on 
Parliament will be one of the great issues for the United Kingdom 
in the present century. 48 
¶ 27 Something similar to the question Professor Baker poses might be asked 
about the recent possible tendency of the United States Supreme Court, in reviewing and 
possibly invalidating the action of state legislatures to look for guidance in what has been 
done in the European Community. 49  These, then, are five uniquely informative and 
provocative papers, whose highly nuanced character has only been hinted at in this brief 
introduction.  These five scholars have produced papers which require us really to come 
to grips with not only the questions of what are human rights, and what is their likely 
future evolution, but, indeed the very purpose of the preservation of such rights.  All of 
these authors, it would seem, understand (although with varying levels of emphasis) that 
human rights are about more than selfish individualism, and that their preservation has 
been and ought to be linked with the preservation of community.  Indeed, perhaps it does 
not go to far to suggest that in these papers one can find something of Oliver Wendell 
                                                 
46 Id. at ¶ 98.  
47 Id. at ¶ 100.  
48 Baker, supra  note 8, at ¶ 23.  
49 Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2481, 539 U.S., at ___ (citing the European Convention on Human Rights, 
and its application in Dudgeon v. U.K., 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1981)). 
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Holmes, Jr.’s much vaunted “echoes of the infinite,”50 of humankind’s continual striving 
for justice, but also of the elusive values such justice seeks to foster.   
¶ 28 Perhaps the greatest service rendered by these five papers is to expose the 
strong tensions between and among “human rights,” “the rule of law,” and “national 
sovereignty.”  They lay bare the paradox of our modern conceptions of and striving for 
international human rights. This is that what makes the preservation of those purportedly 
“universal” rights ultimately worthwhile is the generation of values that may flow as 
much from diverse cultures and peoples as from universal conceptions.  National 
sovereignty is, at some level, essential to produce and maintain those values, but the 
institutions of international human rights, as Glendon reminds us,51 threaten that 
sovereignty in a manner that is unprecedented in the modern age.  
                                                 
50Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897).  
51 “A growing number of scholars have raised their voices against the sort of internationalism that waxes 
enthusiastic over the idea of supranational institutions in readiness to over-ride national constitutions and 
democratic legislation in the name of human rights.  Robert Araujo has argued that an internationalist 
program of that type ultimately undermines all human rights, because sovereignty—the exercise of free 
self-government by a people—is itself a fundamental human right, one that is essential for the protection of 
all the fundamental rights to which it is inextricably linked.” Glendon, supra  note 22, at ¶ 34 (citing  Robert 
Araujo, Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Self-Determination: The Meaning of International Law, 24 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1477(2001)). “In a similar vein, Kenneth Minogue contends that the problem with 
insufficiently differentiated internationalism is that it aims not only to transcend the nation state but to 
over-ride the politics of democratically constituted states. This project, he bluntly states, “cannot . . . be 
anything other than a bid for power by a new class of power holders.’” Id. (quoting  Kenneth Minogue, 
Transnational Interest, AM. OUTLOOK, Spring 2000, at 54). See Stephen B. Presser, “Liberty Under Law” 
Under Siege, 45 ORBIS 357 (2001).  
